

CONTINUITY OF SERVICES

Standard Operating Guide No. 005

MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
AGRICULTURAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIONS
LIVESTOCK DISEASE EMERGENCY



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1.0 SCOPE AND APPLICATION

The purpose of this monograph is to provide functional guidance about the maintenance of services throughout a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) emergency, especially within quarantined areas. The need for public services, such as police, fire and emergency medical services (EMS), will continue at normal or elevated levels during an event, even within a quarantine area. In addition, the response to a FAD will alter the traditional first-responder paradigm of a short-lived response (e.g., several hour duration), which will be replaced by a long-term day-in and day-out need for response personnel, further stressing available resources. This also will be true for other private services, such as feed delivery and other infrastructure maintenance activities. FAD emergencies often require counties to operate for an extended period of time under quarantine orders and other restrictions. During a FAD response, communities will need to provide essential public and private services, but at the same time maintain biosecurity protocols that are critical to mitigating the spread of a disease.

2.0 SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES

This standard operating guide (SOG) presents the operational considerations and details associated with maintaining public and some private services during a FAD, especially within quarantine areas. The monograph provides suggestions for preventing the spread of an animal disease while allowing essential community functions to continue.

It will be critical to identify local public and private services that are important to maintain within the quarantine area during the entire response to the FAD. Once these critical services are identified, local emergency management should work with the private and public entities involved to develop operational plans that will allow these services to continue throughout the FAD response. The importance of these planning partnerships cannot be overstated. Effective, meaningful partnerships will result in coordinated planning, information sharing, and formal memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and mutual aid agreements. These will allow a response to unfold in a more organized and effective manner during an emergency. The



elimination of the need to develop these plans in the first stages of a response will allow critical assets to be directed at the response without delay, and resources can be diverted to planning.

Fundamental issues that will need to be addressed focus on biosecurity associated with moving vehicles, supplies and personnel within and out of a quarantine area. The following SOG text will address some critical services and typical considerations necessary to develop plans for continuity of service during a FAD response. The continuation of services will be dependent on an entity's ability to function in a manner complementary to the FAD response and disease containment effort.

This SOG provides guidelines for local planning and actions; however, specific local requirements will depend on the critical service and the entity providing the service, especially in the case of non-governmental services. This SOG is not intended to provide solutions; rather, it is designed to discuss continuity of service issues relative to a FAD response and highlight areas that will challenge both private and public entities' abilities to provide these fundamental and critical services.

This SOG contains information from and is consistent with NAHEMS guidelines, as of November 2008.

2.1 First Responders

Law enforcement, fire and EMS, traditional first responders in local jurisdictions, will continue normal call or caseloads during a FAD event. In some instances, the demand for these services may even increase. For example, personnel may deal with additional crowd control or domestic incidents associated with community and producer frustration that could accompany any response effort that has not achieved universal understanding or acceptance.



Depending on the FAD, law enforcement's role may include enforcing the State Veterinarian's orders (e.g., quarantines or travel restrictions), securing the perimeter of contaminated areas, restricting animal movement, securing animal production facilities, controlling crowds, investigating scenes of suspected biological terrorism, and protecting response staging areas. Fire and EMS resources may have additional responsibilities associated with cleaning and disinfection (C&D), crowd control, traffic control and carcass disposal (if incineration is used).

Incineration of carcasses is an effective way to eliminate an infectious agent. In addition to incineration of carcasses, it may become necessary to burn structures made of wood or other porous materials. In this event, the need for fire personnel to conduct controlled burns and to monitor carcass and structure burning will further tax the resources available from local jurisdictions.

In some situations, emergency calls within the quarantine area will need to be responded to. In all cases, human life takes precedence over animal disease containment. However, the development of certain protocols can reduce the chances for further disease spread resulting from an EMS response. In cases of emergencies, such as those associated with human health or safety issues within the quarantine area, personnel and equipment that have entered or left the quarantine area should go through cleaning and disinfection once the emergency has been mitigated. This will require communication and coordination between the Unified Command associated with the FAD response and the final destination of the emergency vehicle(s), victim(s) and emergency personnel. This coordination should include disease containment and mitigation procedures for exposed and potentially exposed personnel and equipment. Non-life threatening events should be attended to by passing through the established response-developed protocols for entering the quarantine area. Many hospitals have contagious disease and human quarantine procedures. In the event of treating victims transported out of a FAD quarantine area, local emergency management should coordinate the uses of these procedures in the event of a FAD response.



In a large-scale FAD event, law enforcement, fire and EMS resources will quickly become overwhelmed, and these agencies will have to balance their resources and efforts between these new responsibilities and everyday service demands. All of this may have to be accomplished with a greatly diminished workforce, as personnel and their families may become directly involved in the response if they own susceptible species of animals. It is possible that some of these personnel will determine that the risk of continuing to report to work is just too great to their livestock or poultry. One option for addressing a staffing shortfall involves redirecting personnel performing functions that are deemed nonessential during a FAD incident (e.g., training and recruiting) and having them perform primary response tasks. Reprioritizing calls for police services may have to occur, and smaller agencies may have to partner with larger agencies to provide service during periods of staff reduction (DOJ, 2006). For example, county weed control or county animal control personnel may be tasked to redirect their efforts to support the local FAD response. In addition, mutual aid agreements that provide for multi-jurisdictional interoperability and support should be established in advance. These agreements can often greatly increase local capacities to respond to emergencies; however, in a regional or statewide event, they may be of little use since local jurisdictions are likely to keep assets local to support local response.

Law enforcement officers, firefighters, EMS and other county employees are more likely to report to work if their families and livestock or poultry are safe and protected. This effect may be magnified in jurisdictions with a high percentage of volunteer firefighters. Advanced education in FAD response and potential risks, including information on biosecurity, the value of sheltering-in-place for families inside a quarantine zone, items that should be stockpiled, and pre-event planning (possibly securing a temporary residence for responders so they do not bring the disease home) may encourage a larger number of county personnel to report for duty (DOJ, 2006).

Jurisdictions may wish to examine alternatives for activities that may not require highly trained individuals, such as water shuttles or hose-down operations. Correctional facilities may be a



source of such labor. Historically, certain classes of pre-trained inmates have proven invaluable during western wildfire suppression activities. The same concept could be applied to an agricultural response. These approaches could allow trained resources to focus on the more technical aspects of the response.

Appropriate personnel assignments should help limit the movement into and out of the quarantine area. When possible, personnel should be designated to work either within or out of the quarantine area. This will greatly reduce the resources required to staff and run an access control point (See MDA SOG No. 001, *Traffic Control*, and No. 002, *Cleaning and Disinfection*). Emergency personnel that work with, own, or otherwise have contact with susceptible species of animal, relative to a particular FAD, should not be used to work within a quarantine area. If this exclusion is impractical, these personnel should be trained in biosecurity and have personnel plans to eliminate the possibility of spreading a FAD to their animals.

Personnel working within the quarantine area should be provided personal protective equipment (PPE), as directed by the response's health and safety officer. This will minimize their exposure to contaminated materials and make cleaning and disinfection easier. Unless stipulated by the incident command, respiratory protection will probably not be necessary (see MDA SOG No. 004, *Cleaning and Disinfection*).

2.2 Trash Service

Municipal trash service will generally need to be maintained. It is important to handle waste from response activities, as well as typical trash service required by individuals, inside a quarantine area. Trash service providers should be aware of cleaning and disinfection requirements. It may be possible for the frequency of trash pick-up to be adjusted to reduce the number of days trash trucks need to enter the quarantine area. Options for disposal inside a quarantine area should be considered. Options for disposal could include the creation of a



landfill or the use of air curtain incinerators to dispose of trash inside the quarantine zone. This type of planning needs to be coordinated with the DNR.

If trash must be removed from the quarantine area for disposal, it should be moved in a container that does not allow solids or liquids to be released. The use of conventional trash trucks may not be acceptable since many are not liquid-tight. If other vehicles (e.g., dump trucks, etc.) or roll-offs are used, they must be lined to prevent liquid leakage and they must be covered to prevent solid contents from being blown out by the wind during transport. Whether the trash is disposed of inside or outside of the quarantine area, it must be disposed of and isolated immediately. If this is not done, blowing trash or scavenger access to the trash could lead to the disease migrating out of the quarantine area. This may require pre-planning with local landfills to ensure that quarantine loads are buried immediately. In some situations, it may be possible to have individuals from some quarantined locations deliver their own trash to designated drop-off locations within the quarantine area. This also would reduce the movement in and out of the quarantine area. If the disposal location falls within the quarantine area, trucks leaving the area to pick up trash would need to be cleaned and disinfected. If possible, trash service could dedicate some trucks to operate solely inside the quarantine area and others to operate outside of the quarantine to reduce cleaning and disinfection. Dumpsters or roll-off bins could be used to store trash until the appropriate truck picked it up, depending on the location of the landfill (i.e., using a clean truck if landfill is located outside the quarantine or a dirty truck if landfill is located inside the quarantine).

Incineration of trash inside the quarantine area also is an option to consider. An effective and efficient method of incinerating trash involves the use of an air curtain incinerator. The operating principle of an air curtain incinerator lies in the introduction of controlled high velocity air across the upper portion of a combustion chamber in which clean wood waste or other fuel is loaded. The powerful curtain of air created in this process traps unburned particles under the air curtain in the high temperature zone where temperatures can reach 1,832° F (1,000° C). The trapping of particles under this curtain of air increases combustion time and turbulence resulting



in a re-burn and more complete combustion of the loaded trash. The resulting emissions from a properly operating air curtain incinerator will have an opacity rate below 10 percent during most steady state operations. This type of equipment is available for rent and requires little training to safely operate.

2.3 Medical Services

If a person in the infected zone, from an infected or exposed premise, is injured or becomes seriously ill, every effort must be made to aid and obtain medical care for the person as quickly as possible. The very nature of a FAD response means that there is a risk of transporting the infection with the injured person. For example, if it is necessary to initiate an emergency transport of personnel out of the infected zone, the level of initial C&D of the person injured will vary with the seriousness of the injuries. Human life is a priority and every measure must be taken to minimize discomfort or pain. If C&D procedures for the personnel and vehicle must be abbreviated due to the extent of an injury or medical condition, the risk of spreading a disease could be great. In this case, the EOC must be notified. The EOC will then notify the appropriate hospital authorities of the risk and the appropriate means of personal disinfection for the patient and vehicle, which should be carried out as soon as circumstances permit.

To minimize the potential to spread a FAD during an emergency transport situation, the following steps should be taken as soon as possible (NAHEMS, 2003a):

- The Incident Commander should be notified of the incident.
- An individual experienced in biosecurity and cleaning and disinfection procedures should be sent – along with cleaning and disinfection supplies – to meet the emergency vehicle at the medical facility.
- The Incident Commander or a designee should inform authorities at the medical facility of the existence of the risk of FAD transmission and ensure that C&D procedures for the patient and medical personnel are initiated as soon as appropriate.
- The patient's clothing and any of the medical personnel's clothing that may have become contaminated should be sealed in a plastic garbage bag. Disposable clothing can be worn by the emergency personnel and the victim to minimize the potential spread of



contamination. Potentially contaminated clothing should be: (a) discarded safely or (b) removed from the bag and laundered, with care taken to dispose of the contaminated bag safely. Any contaminated medical equipment should be cleaned thoroughly (if possible, autoclaved) and disinfected with an approved disinfectant.

- Any surface – inside or outside the medical facility – that may have become contaminated should be cleaned thoroughly and disinfected with an approved disinfectant.
- The emergency vehicle should be cleaned and disinfected, including the interior, underside, wheels and wheel wells.
- Any clothing or boots of emergency vehicle attendants, orderlies or other personnel that may have become contaminated should be removed; sealed in a plastic garbage bag; laundered, dry cleaned or disinfected with an approved disinfectant; or discarded.

2.4 Schools

Many issues remain to be addressed regarding human quarantine or confinement during a non-zoonotic event involving a pathogen transmissible only between animals. Nonetheless, school jurisdictions need to consider and plan for the possibility that a decision could be made, as was the case in England (UK) during the 2001 epidemic of Foot and Mouth disease, to confine families residing on infected premises to their properties until they had been cleared of infection. In the UK, such confinement extended to nearly six months in some cases. In Missouri, every effort will be made to avoid the need to implement this level of quarantine. It may be necessary to relocate families from infected premises to temporary shelter outside of a quarantine area. This would alleviate the impact of quarantine on education.

Local emergency management needs to develop plans to communicate information regarding a FAD outbreak and resulting response to local school districts. In addition, local jurisdictions need to partner with local schools and school districts to develop plans for continuing the education of students within quarantine zones. These plans will address the establishment of group pick-up points for students within a quarantine zone, appropriate biosecurity measures to allow the students to leave the area, intra-school education and information releases for students and families not in the quarantine area. This aspect of public information will be critical in



dispelling fears of non-affected students and their families. In addition, this information will be critical to increasing biosecurity of all school families and containing the disease to the quarantine area.

Continuing education for children is likely to be identified as a critical service that should be maintained during a FAD emergency. In some instances, the development of distance learning programs will be an effective way to keep students on pace with non-affected children. An alternative plan could utilize off-farm in-community rental housing to shelter school-age children and at least one parent for the duration of the event. School districts should be encouraged to appoint an appropriate liaison officer to work with local emergency management officials in exploration of the district's role and responsibilities to its students during a prolonged FAD response.

2.5 Mail and Delivery Service

The restriction of mail and other delivery services will depend on decisions made by animal health authorities and the incident commander relative to the size and degree of access control required in various infected (quarantine) or surveillance zones. The most restricted and impacted zone would be in the Infected Zone (IZ, see MDA SOG No. 001, *Traffic Control*). There would be no uncontrolled access to this zone. The Buffer Surveillance Zone (BSZ) would be the next most restricted area. Together, these two zones comprise the Control Zone (CZ). Standard mail and other carriers would need procedures in place to provide centralized deliveries at the entry to the CZ. It might be necessary to consider internal distribution of packages and letters by authorized personnel trained and operating under proper biosecurity protocols. Timely distribution of parcels may be critical, especially if citizens within the quarantine area are relying on mail order medications. In addition, if outgoing mail is permitted, centralized mail and parcel drop stations will need to be established inside the quarantine zone. Mail from these stations will need to be collected by authorized personnel and taken to pre-arranged drop points or containers outside the quarantine area. This will allow control of mail and parcel movement out of the



quarantine zone and eliminate the need for mail and parcel companies to enter the quarantine area for pickups. If this option is employed, the applicable policies and legal constraints need to be understood to meet all relevant rules and regulations. Local emergency management is encouraged to involve the local Postmaster in this aspect of continuity of services planning. To provide for additional communication support to residents within a quarantine zone, local response agencies could consider establishing e-mail centers within the quarantine zone where residents could send written messages outside the quarantine zone, in addition to phone messages, greatly reducing the need for mail to leave the quarantine area.

Depending on the FAD and the stage of the response, mail and other deliveries originating in the quarantine area may need to be temporarily suspended. While this is an extreme case, if it were to occur it would create challenges associated with families and businesses inside a quarantine zone paying bills. In many cases, electronic bill payment will not be an option. The local emergency management may need to plan to have support personnel work with impacted families and businesses to arrange alternative bill payment methods or temporary postponement of payments. The local chamber of commerce may have some expertise that could be used to support this effort.

2.6 Maintenance of Retail and Other Public Service Providers

Retail stores, supermarkets, hospitals and other similar establishments that provide critical services to a community often rely on frequent and sometimes daily supply shipments to maintain their services to the community. If these entities are within a quarantine zone and they represent critical community services, a decision will be made to maintain their ability to service the community. For local jurisdictions this means that additional C&D resources may be needed to accommodate the delivery vehicles as they leave the quarantine area. These resources can be applied at normal access control points, or special delivery access and exit points could be established to deal with these commercial shipments and not traffic associated with responders or private citizens. The creation and manning of such specialized access and exit points are



discussed in more detail in section 2.9, *Feed Deliveries*, below. An alternative to this approach is to have these supplies offloaded at an access control point and transferred to vehicles inside the quarantine zone for delivery. Since the original delivery vehicle never crosses into the quarantine zone, it will not need cleaning and disinfection. The secondary transport, inside the quarantine zone, if dedicated to transportation within the quarantine zone, would require less C&D, until it exited the quarantine area.

2.7 Companion Animals

Companion animals, horses and other non-susceptible animals may need to be transported out of a quarantine area. The approval for this type of movement will be with the State Veterinarian's office and the Unified Command. If this movement is allowed, generally under a state-issued permit, the Unified Command will determine the need to C&D animals that are removed from the quarantine area. If this type of C&D is required, the State Veterinarian's office and the Unified Command will provide personnel working at quarantine area access points appropriate guidance on cleaning and disinfecting animals that are leaving the area. All equipment (i.e., kennels, trailers, etc.) also should be cleaned and disinfected. Careful consideration should be used when selecting the appropriate disinfectant to use on animals. Some commercial disinfectants, specifically those containing coal or wood tar, are toxic to cats. Local humane societies and animal shelter personnel may be sources of volunteers and equipment to deal with companion animals leaving a quarantine area.

2.8 Volunteer Services and Community Based Organizations

Volunteer agencies and community based organizations (CBO) provide essential services to local vulnerable populations. These groups may provide daily meal delivery, clothing, education, essential supplies, medicines, etc.; in-home medical care; hospice services; and other support to vulnerable populations. Many of these services may be essential and could result in catastrophic health impacts if discontinued. Simply restricting these organizations from



operating within a quarantine area may place increased demand on local response assets to provide these essential services to the vulnerable populations. In most cases, local response entities may not have the resources available to take on the work of the volunteer groups and CBOs. Local emergency management should work with these organizations to determine which services can be provided at access control points, limiting the need to enter quarantine areas, and which services must continue for the home-bound population. In some cases it will be less resource intensive to relocate home-bound clients to areas outside a quarantine zone.

2.9 Livestock Feed Deliveries

It is estimated that as many as one-third of the 6.1 million animals culled in the UK in 2001 were slaughtered on “welfare grounds.” Producers simply ran out of feedstuffs and were unable to replenish supplies due to tight agricultural movement controls. Many, if not most, were trapped inside surveillance zones and were never found to be infected with the virus.

All necessary animal production inputs, including feed, labor and ancillary services, must be sustained and provided to susceptible and non-susceptible species within a quarantine zone. State and county jurisdictions may need to consider “animal feed delivery” as an emergency response contingency. Local jurisdictions should plan how this service will be maintained and, in some cases, local jurisdictions may need to identify sources of feed that could be accessed during a response. This may be especially applicable if a local jurisdiction’s temporary animal housing area falls within a quarantine zone (see MDA SOG No. 003, *Temporary Housing and Care for Livestock and Poultry*). Local planners should remember that it is virtually impossible to deliver feed to an infected area without the delivery vehicle and any remaining feed having a high probability of being contaminated. Feed deliveries within the CZ must be carefully planned and subject to strict decontamination procedures.

Along with labor and the supply of other inputs, feed deliveries could be implemented by using staging areas or transfer points between uninfected areas, Free Zones (FZ), where fresh feed is



available, and the CZ where access and movement are controlled. If this type of feed transfer is considered, feed should be transferred from a “clean” truck (one originating outside the quarantine zone) to the “dirty” truck (from a location within the quarantine zone) at an appropriate location at the edge of the CZ. An appropriate place would allow the “clean” truck to drive into the CZ on paved roads, not traveled by vehicles from infected farms, and where the prevailing winds blow from the “clean” truck toward the off-loading location where the “dirty” truck is located. The driver of the farm truck should stay in his truck while the feed is transferred.

Movement of feed out of infected premises should be prohibited and considered a potential source of infection. Contaminated or suspected feed should be destroyed, preferably on site. Burial or incineration is a viable option (see MDA SOG No. 002, *Catastrophic Mortality Disposal*).

Feed mills that are epidemiologically linked to infected premises (contaminated) will likely be considered as separate infected premises and quarantined.

2.10 Movement of Farm Commodities

Perishable or time-sensitive food products must move off the farm to processing on a steady basis in order to maintain the current “on-demand” delivery of America’s food supply. Some animal species, particularly poultry, must be marketed within a very narrow age range or else the product quality and consumer acceptance may suffer, impacting consumer demand. In addition, processing plants are generally designed for a narrow range of poultry or livestock size and weight ranges. A FAD response may require that certain animal and plant commodities are restricted from leaving a quarantine zone. Some of these commodities, such as milk, are either perishable or they may act as a fomite, physically transporting the disease agent. In these cases, producers will most likely be directed to dispose of the materials on-site. For example, dairy producers will most likely be asked to acidify their milk and dispose of it on-site. Local



emergency management can assist producers with identifying acceptable ways and locations to dispose of commodities that cannot leave a quarantine area.

For commodities that are allowed to leave a quarantine zone, local emergency management needs to plan to set-up access control (exit) points dedicated to the movement of commodities out of the quarantine area (see MDA SOG No. 001, *Traffic Control*). These exit points should not be associated with the general access and exits points for a quarantine zone; however, they will require C&D capabilities and staffing similar to those incorporated at the general access points to the quarantine area (see MDA SOG No. 004, *Cleaning and Disinfection*). In addition, personnel at these points will need to be trained to review state-issued transport permits, as well as inspect departing vehicles and cargo for proper biosecurity protocols. Much of the inspection and permitting requirements will be developed by MDA as the response unfolds; therefore, constant communication with these personnel will be essential to maintaining disease containment in the quarantine zone. Because of the nature of commodity shipments, it may be possible to establish set operating hours for these exit points that do not require continuous staffing. This will greatly reduce personnel and equipment resource needs associated with maintaining a quarantine. In a large event, a quarantine area may border on multiple counties. Under these conditions, it would be beneficial for local jurisdictions to plan on combining resources to staff and maintain a limited number of these exit points. Mutual aid agreements will make this resource sharing more timely and efficient. Planning on how to establish and staff these exit points also will allow a more rapid and efficient response, further helping producers in each jurisdiction to maintain their livelihoods.

Local communities are encouraged to preplan the logistics necessary for continued marketing of their local agricultural commodities during an emergency. These plans will focus on the establishment and operation of commodity exit points from a quarantine zone. The ultimate decision of whether grains, milk, eggs, live animals and other agricultural commodities can leave a quarantine area will be made by the Unified Command.



Local emergency managers should develop a general understanding of the commodities grown in their counties; be able to identify equipment suppliers that could assist with maintaining the movement of those commodities out of the quarantine zone; know the shipment cycle of those commodities; and know the FADs that are likely to impact the movement of those commodities. This planning will need to be coordinated with MDA and MDNR.

2.11 Utilities

Utility service workers (water, power, telephone, and sewage management) will be critical in maintaining fundamental services to citizens and responders within a quarantine zone. A response to a FAD would not in and of itself interrupt these services, but repairs and routine maintenance in a quarantine zone could be delayed and problematic. Pre-planning with utility companies to ensure that this repair and maintenance is coordinated with the response is critical. Pre-planning may include biosecurity training for these workers and local emergency management review of a company's contingency plans for working in quarantine zones. Familiarity with county and state plans for a FAD response will provide utility companies with the necessary information to create appropriate contingency plans. Understanding the biosecurity and other travel restrictions associated with area quarantines, in advance, is essential for this planning. It is likely that these utility services will develop plans addressing the same issues and concerns raised in Section 2.1, *Law Enforcement and Fire*, of this SOG.

2.12 Training

Personnel training will be a critical component of planning to provide a continuation of public services within a quarantine area. Besides livestock and poultry-handling experience, all personnel associated with providing services inside a quarantine zone will benefit from training in: biosecurity, FAD, the operation and maintenance of the disinfection equipment, disinfection procedures, associated environmental protection issues, and documentation requirements. Cooperative extension personnel, Missouri Volunteer Veterinary Corps veterinarians, and other



qualified state and federal employees can provide many aspects of this training to personnel responsible for maintaining the continuity of public services in the quarantine area. Local fire and emergency medical services personnel can provide training in C&D. In some counties, law enforcement and local public health personnel also can provide cleaning and disinfection training. Local veterinarians can provide training in biosecurity.

REFERENCES

Department of Justice, September 2006, The Role of Law Enforcement in Public Health Emergencies: Special Considerations for an All-Hazards Approach, NCJ 214333.

NAHEMS Guidelines. (2003a). *Quarantine and Movement Control: Highly Contagious Disease*. United States Department of Agriculture. May 5, 2003.

NAHEMS Guidelines. (2005). *Highly Contagious Diseases*. United States Department of Agriculture. September 2005.



APPENDIX A

BIOSECURITY
(NAHEMS 2005)



Before ENTERING premises,

DO:

- Park your vehicle away from site production facilities and ensure that your vehicle's tires and wheel wells have been hosed so they are free of dirt and debris and that your vehicle has been taken through a pressure car wash.
- Designate a "clean" area in your vehicle – usually the passenger compartment. Keep it separate from the "dirty" area – usually the trunk or cargo area.
- Put on clean coveralls, boots, hat, gloves, and other apparel, and use only clean equipment and supplies.
- Wash your hands with soap and water.
- Consult with the owner to identify an arbitrary line on the site demarcating a "clean" side and a "dirty" side.

DON'T:

- Enter a site's or vehicle's "clean" area unless you have disposed of or cleaned and disinfected all clothes, footwear, hats, gloves, equipment, supplies, and other sources of disease transmission.
- Attempt to disinfect a surface unless it first has been thoroughly cleaned.
- Drive your vehicle on premises any more than necessary. An on-site vehicle should be used for on-site transportation whenever possible.



Before LEAVING premises,

DO:

- Use a brush and approved disinfectant to clean and disinfect all reusable equipment and clothing, including eyewear, thoroughly.
- Hose down vehicle tires and wheel wells so they are free of dirt and debris.
- Place disposable coveralls (turned “inside out”), boots, and other soiled items in a plastic garbage bag to be left with the owner or placed in the “dirty” area of your vehicle.
- Dispose of the disinfectant solution according to label instructions.
- Dispose of all plastic garbage bags containing soiled supplies in a manner that prevents exposure to other people or animals.
- Wash your hands with soap and water.
- Clean and launder all reusable clothing and equipment.
- Take a shower and shampoo your hair, clean under your fingernails, and clear your respiratory passages by blowing your nose, clearing your throat, expectorating into a sink with running water, and washing your hands with soap and water.

DON'T:

- Bring “dirty” paperwork into the clean area of your vehicle.
- Visit another susceptible site until 12 hours have passed. The minimum waiting period of 12 hours applies only to official animal health emergency personnel who follow biosecurity procedures on their premises visits. For other premises visitors, the minimum waiting period is 5 days. Additional information is available in the NAHEMS 2003a.

